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C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002774

SIPDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR EDELMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2014

TAGS: CY PREL TU

SUBJECT: UPCOMING UN AND U.S. ACTION ON CYPRUS

REF: A. NICOSIA 0860  
    B. 30 MARCH 2004 RIES EU MEETINGS  
    C. ANKARA 2341

(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman, E.O. 12958,  
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶11. (C) With the SYG's report on the Cyprus negotiations and the referendum set to come out soon, it is important that we engage in a full-court press for a strong follow-on UNSCR despite the formidable UNSC obstacles and other political hurdles. The SYG's report, and the resulting UNSC debate and resolution, are critically important to our twin strategic goals of comprehensively settling Cyprus and assisting Turkey's EU vocation. I read with concern ref A's account of the GC campaign to orchestrate a report excluding relevant information unfavorable to the GCs. I expect a similar effort in the UNSC. As Ambassador Klossen noted, I hope the SYG's report and resulting UNSC action include what happened in the negotiations and through the referendum -- and why.

¶12. (C) Fairness demands no less. The UN rightly castigated Turkish and TC obstructionism after the Copenhagen and the Hague; this time should be no different. Failure to completely and accurately reflect what happened and why leaves a distorted post-referendum UN record. That record currently consists of bland press releases on April 28 and ¶129. The April 28 press release of U/S Pendergast's briefing notes that "now was not the time to go into details" in several key areas. That time is now.

¶13. (C) The UN's language will influence Turkey's fate in the EU, which links Turkey's EU bid to cooperation with the SYG's Good Offices Mission. The EU will use the report and resulting UNSCR to judge Turkey's performance in this area. By December, EU memories of the negotiations and the referendum will have faded. Some EU Turkey-skeptics are inclined to hold any failure to reach settlement against Turkey (see, e.g., ref B). Unambiguous UN language is the only effective antidote.

¶14. (C) The tone of the UNSCR and the SYG's report will also influence the Turks' willingness to re-engage in future UN efforts toward a comprehensive settlement. Despite the positive initial international response to GOT efforts in support of a Cyprus settlement, the Turks have a lingering distrust of UN involvement in Cyprus. They will view the SYG's report and UNSCR as leading indicators of whether the GOT's pro-solution policy brought real benefits for Turkey and the TCs.

¶15. (C) I am also concerned that we have not yet been able to show or even announce the steps we will take to reach out to Turkish Cypriots. We have been telling the Turks steps are coming, but lack of any more concrete news is beginning to cause problems. The MFA told us last week that military hardliners opposed to settlement who had remained silent over the past few months are beginning to complain, with increasing intensity, that nothing has changed for the TCs. Over time, this damages USG credibility and threatens Ankara's tenuous pro-settlement consensus (ref C). U/S Ziyal has called me in to discuss Cyprus tomorrow, and I expect some pointed questions about where we are in our decisionmaking process.

EDELMAN